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Abstract. Secure multi-party computation (SMC) techniques are increasingly
becoming more efficient and practical thanks to many recent novel improvements.
The recent work have shown that different protocols that are implemented us-
ing different sharing mechanisms (e.g., boolean, arithmetic sharings, etc.) may
have different computational and communication costs. Although there are some
works that automatically mix protocols of different sharing schemes to fasten
execution, none of them provide a generic optimization framework to find the
cheapest mixed-protocol SMC execution for cloud deployment.
In this work, we propose a generic SMC optimization framework CheapSMC
that can use any mixed-protocol SMC circuit evaluation tool as a black-box to
find the cheapest SMC cloud deployment option. To find the cheapest SMC pro-
tocol, CheapSMC runs one time benchmarks for the target cloud service and gath-
ers performance statistics for basic circuit components. Using these performance
statistics, optimization layer of CheapSMC runs multiple heuristics to find the
cheapest mix-protocol circuit evaluation. Later on, the optimized circuit is passed
to a mix-protocol SMC tool for actual executable generation. Our empirical re-
sults gathered by running different cases studies show that significant cost savings
could be achieved using our optimization framework.
1 Introduction
Over the last couple of years, many two party secure multi-party computation (SMC)
protocols have been proposed to address different secure computation needs ranging
from privacy-preserving face recognition (e.g., [22]) to secure biometric identification
(e.g., [10]). In addition, many generic two party circuit evaluation platforms (e.g. [4,13])
have been developed to improve the efficiency of the existing secure protocols. Most of
these platforms (e.g., [16]) also provide high level programming language support that
can automatically generate circuits from programs written in C like languages. These
recent advances made two party SMC protocols ever more practical and created the
possibility of wide spread deployment in practice.
Still, there are other problems that need to be solved to make these platforms truly
practical. One important challenge that received little attention is the performance op-
timization. Recent work [8] showed that different two party SMC protocols may have
different computational and communication cost profiles. For example, arithmetic shar-
ing based circuit evaluation protocols may be better for certain tasks compared to Yao’s
garbled circuit evaluation protocols. On the other hand, boolean secret sharing based
circuit evaluation techniques could be best in some situations. It has been shown [8]
that combination of these three different techniques could perform much better than
using any single one of them. This raises the following research question: how to find
the best combination of the different two party SMC techniques for a given task?
Unfortunately, most of the existing work do not consider the problem of finding the
optimal combination of different sharing based protocols for a given task and require the
user to manually choose the specific sub-protocols. Although there were some recent
work that tries to optimize and automate the selection process (e.g., [15]), that work had
limited scope with respect to the cost dimensions that the user can choose to optimize.
For example, if one party leverages a cloud infrastructure for running the protocol, the
network communication may significantly impact the overall monetary cost paid by the
parties. Therefore, we need an optimization framework that can automatically consider
communication, computation and monetary costs when finding the optimal two party
SMC protocol composition.
Our goal in this work is to build an optimization framework where the given two
party SMC task could be automatically optimized under the given cost constraints; and
the optimal (or near optimal) combination of different sharing based sub-protocols (e.g.,
arithmetic, boolean, Yao’s secret sharing protocols, etc.) are selected automatically. Our
goal could be seen similar to other automatic task optimization frameworks seen in other
systems. In our optimization framework, we especially focus on the cloud setting since
the cloud computing is being widely adopted by organizations [11] due to its flexibility
and low initial cost of ownership. In the cloud setting, in addition to minimizing the
overall run time of the system, we may need to balance the network traffic, and compu-
tation time to achieve overall lowest monetary cost. This makes the problem even more
challenging since we may need to consider both communication and computation costs
in the optimal mix-protocol circuit generation.
Overview of the CheapSMC. The aim of our system is to make it easier for the
parties to implement and execute SMC protocols, while minimizing the monetary cost
of the SMC execution in the cloud. In order to ease the implementation phase and
make our system easily extensible to available SMC tools, we divided CheapSMC into
three main parts. The Programming API acts as the front-end for the users that allows
them to implement their SMC protocol using our C++ library. In the end, this layer is
responsible for representing the user protocol as a circuit of atomic operations. Note
that our system can be further extended by designing a custom language (e.g., SFDL of
Fairplay [16]), which uses our Programming API in the background. In this work, we
do not focus on such integration and instead focus on the optimization aspects.
The Optimization Module is responsible for assigning secret sharing schemes (e.g.,
Arithmetic, Boolean, Yao sharing as in the ABY framework [8]; Additively homomor-
phic, Yao sharing as in the Tasty framework [13], etc.) to the nodes in the circuit, such
that the total cost of executing this protocol in cloud is minimized. Since finding an opti-
mal solution to this optimization problem is NP-Hard, the optimization module provides
heuristics to find near optimal solutions.
Finally, the SMC Layer actually implements the optimized circuit given some exist-
ing SMC tool (e.g., ABY, Sharemind [4]). Since the proposal for new and more efficient
SMC tools is a popular research topic, the design of CheapSMC does not focus on a sin-
gle SMC tool that could limit its usefulness. Instead, we leverage a given SMC tool as
a black-box, provided that it is a mixed-protocol SMC tool (i.e., allows implementation
using different sharing schemes).
CheapSMC proposes several atomic operations (e.g., addition, multiplication, bi-
nary xor, binary and, etc.) that covers various application scenarios. In Section 6, we
show the results of applying our system to several different case studies, while further
applications can simply be done using our C++ library. Moreover, the process of op-
timizing the circuit is totally decoupled from the circuit generation and other layers,
so that proposing a new heuristic and actually implementing it can be achieved with
minimal effort.
Our Contributions. They can be summarized as follows:
– We formally define the problem of minimizing the monetary cost of running SMC
applications in the cloud setting given for circuit based two party SMC protocols.
We particularly focus on the monetary cost of running virtual machines (VMs)
and transferring data over the network in the optimization objectives. Our profiling
results in Section 5 show that the network transfer cost may significantly impact
the overall cost. Therefore, making protocol selections based on just optimizing the
running time may not be ideal (i.e., optimizing performance only).
– We propose an easily extensible system, CheapSMC, which uses existing SMC
tools as a black-box, and propose two different novel heuristics in addition two
existing baseline methods to address the optimization problem. Our heuristics spe-
cially designed for the circuit based SMC protocols and can be used with any circuit
based SMC tool.
– We profile the cost of CheapSMC using Amazon EC2 cloud service. We investigate
two different scenarios (i.e., Inter-Region and Intra-Region VM placement) and
four different VM models. For each combination, we derive the average cost of
executing atomic operations that highly depends on the VM model and the scenario.
– We apply our system to two applications (e.g., biometric matching, matrix mul-
tiplication) and evaluate the monetary cost reductions achieved by our platform.
We compare our heuristics with existing optimization heuristic of Kerschbaum et
al. [15], and pure garbled circuit [27]. For the Inter-Region scenario, our heuristics
gives up to 96% and 30% cheaper results compared to pure garbled circuit execu-
tion and Kerschbaum et al., respectively.
2 Background
Secret Sharing is a well-known cryptographic primitive that allows a party to partition
its secret input and share those partitions (called a share) with other parties. [24]. Due
to the nature of the secret sharing, none of the parties (except the party that owns the
secret input) can learn anything about the secret input by just looking at a given share.
A number of shares should be combined to reconstruct the partitioned secret.
In the remaining of the paper, we will heavily use several different two party secret
sharing schemes, such as Arithmetic, Boolean, Yao. We will briefly discuss them here.
Arithmetic Secret Sharing In this secret sharing scheme, the secret is assumed to an
integer x in a ring Zn. The first party, who owns the secret x, generates a random
number x1 ∈ Zn and subtracts it from the secret to get x2 ≡ x − x1 mod n. x1 is
the first party’s share, while x2 sent to the second party is her share. This type of secret
sharing is also called the Additive Secret Sharing [6].
Boolean Secret Sharing The key idea of this secret sharing scheme is similar to the
previous one, except the granularity of the sharing. In order to share a secret using
Boolean sharing, first the secret should be represented in its binary form, then each bit
is shared separately in mod 2. Given the Boolean shares of a secret, the parties can
execute any operation using the Goldreich-Micali-Widgerson (GMW) protocol [12].
Yao Secret Sharing It is also called the Yao’s Garbled Circuit protocol, and allows
parties to execute any boolean circuit over any number of secret inputs [28]. The key
idea of the garbled circuit protocol is that one party, the garbler, randomly generates two
encryption keys kw0 , kw1 ∈∈ {0, 1}K for each wire w of the circuit. She then encrypts
all combinations of the outputs using the generated keys and sends the encryption keys
for the corresponding input wires of the party, along with the garbled circuit. The other
party, the evaluator, decrypts the wires using the keys at hand, and recurses through
the garbled circuit by using the decrypted keys. An interested reader is referred to the
original paper for the details [28].
Conversion Between Different Schemes Since most SMC tools provide multiple shar-
ing schemes in their implementation, they also provide conversion protocols from one
scheme to another. However the certain steps of the conversion protocol may vary in dif-
ferent SMC tools. The most recent SMC tool, the ABY Framework, allows conversion
amongst Arithmetic, Boolean, and Yao sharing schemes [8]. The Sharemind protocol
shows a different method on converting shares between Arithmetic and Yao sharing [4].
Tasty framework allows conversion between additively homomorphic sharing and Yao
sharing [13] An interested reader is referred to those works for conversion protocols.
3 The Optimal Partitioning Problem
3.1 Problem Definition
Let S = {s1, . . . , sn} be the set of provided secret sharing mechanisms. Then given a
variable x in some domain I, let [x]si represent the secret sharing of x using si.
Next, we define the set of operations O = {o1, . . . , ok} such that each operation
oi ∈ O takes a set of parameters that are secretly shared in sj and outputs a single
variable secretly shared in sj . Note that the number of inputs that an operation takes
is fixed, regardless of the secret sharing scheme. An operation oi is supported in sj ,
if there exists an execution protocol that takes the input parameters to oi and outputs a
result secretly shared in sj . Let δ(oi) ⊆ S represent the secret sharing mechanisms that
support operation oi ∈ O.
Since an operation can be executed in the cloud environment, one should approxi-
mate the monetary cost of performing the protocol execution in a certain setup. In order
to achieve this, we focus on the processing and network transfer costs of executing a
single operation in the pay-as-you-go cloud model. In this computing model, a cus-
tomer of a cloud provider service is charged a constant amount per unit time for using
a particular type of virtual machine (VM), while the prices vary depending on the pro-
cessing capabilities of the VM. On the other hand, the monetary cost of transferring a
single byte in and out of the VM is fixed based on the VM specifications. The unit cost
of network transfer vary as the network capacity of the VM changes.
Under such circumstances, we define the processing and network transfer costs of
executing an operation oi ∈ O in the secret sharing scheme sj ∈ δ(oi) as P(oi, sj) and
N(oi, sj), respectively. Furthermore, we define the processing and network transfer cost
of converting a variable that is secretly shared in si ∈ S to sj ∈ S as CP(si, sj) and
CN(si, sj), respectively. Note that defined costs may vary based on VM specifications.
Given the set of operations O, the parties in the computation (i.e., the server and
the client) implement a circuit C that is represented as a directed acyclic graph (DAG)
and consists of m nodes c1, . . . , cm. Each node represents a single operation and takes
input from other nodes, whereas the number of inputs is decided by the operation. To be
more concrete, let α(ci) ∈ O represent the operation that is assigned to the node ci ∈ C,
while β(ci) ⊆ C is the set of nodes that supply input to ci3. Furthermore, let γ(ci) ∈ S
be the secret sharing scheme assigned to ci. Then the monetary cost of executing a node
ci ∈ C is simply:
cost(ci) = P(α(ci), γ(ci)) + N(α(ci), γ(ci)) +
∑
cj∈β(ci)
CP(γ(cj), γ(ci)) + CN(γ(cj), γ(ci))
(1)
Using the above definitions, the optimal partitioning problem that we investigate in
this paper can be formally defined as follows:
Definition 1. Given the processing and network transfer cost for a set of operations O
using a set of secret sharing schemes S, the cost of conversion between different secret
sharing schemes, and a circuit C = {c1, . . . , cm} of m nodes, where each node ci is
assigned an operation α(ci) ∈ O, assign a secret sharing scheme to each node ci such
that the total monetary cost of executing the circuit with the assigned secret sharing
schemes is minimal.
Given :O,S, C, P(o, s) and N(o, s) ∀o ∈ O, ∀s ∈ δ(o),
CP(si, sj) and CN(si, sj) ∀si, sj ∈ S, α(ci) ∀ci ∈ C
Minimize :
∑
ci∈C
cost(ci) Subject to : γ(ci) ∈ δ(α(ci)) ∀ci ∈ C
(2)
The partitioning problem is NP-Hard, and the reduction can be simply done from
the Integer Programming problem.
3.2 Assumptions
We assume that the protocol between the two parties (i.e., the server and the client) is
represented as a DAG tree. This can easily be assured by the secure multi-party imple-
mentation interface, or by some interpreter that allows programmers to implement the
protocol using a custom programming language. The protocols implemented by that
interface (or custom programming language) can be converted to the circuit represen-
tation. A similar assumption is also made by Kerschbaum et al., where the protocol
written in custom language is transformed into a set of static operations [15].
3 Note that this circuit representation of a computation can be provided by the programming
language.
Finally, we assume that overall secure circuit evaluation is performed sequentially.
In order to decrease the running time and reduce the processing cost, one may execute
the operations specified by the non-dependent nodes in the circuit in parallel. Under
such circumstances, our monetary cost model gives an upper bound on the expected
monetary cost. Nevertheless, the cost model can be augmented to reflect this condi-
tion by considering the number of concurrent threads. However, the processing cost
of executing operations under a secret sharing scheme would not decrease linearly as
more threads are used, since some threads may overlap and block each other from un-
interrupted execution. Due to such complications, the unit cost calculations may not be
accurate. For this reason, we will focus on the sequential protocol execution scenario in
this work; and leave the multi-threaded implementations as a future work.
4 The Details of CheapSMC
4.1 Architecture
CheapSMC has three main parts: (i) The programming interface (API), (ii) the opti-
mization module, and (iii) the SMC layer. Each CheapSMC part is responsible for a
different task: Programming interface morphs user program into the circuit representa-
tion; the optimization module assigns secret sharing schemes to each node in the circuit
using some heuristic; the SMC layer generates the executables using state-of-the-art
cryptographic primitives and techniques. The user of our system is expected to insert
two inputs: specifications of the protocol that is going to be executed securely, and the
unit costs for the operations and secret sharing schemes supported by the SMC frame-
work. As we discuss later, we provide a benchmark suite to automatically learn these
unit costs for any target cloud service to help the user.
User Inputs. The user is assumed to know the secure protocol for the application
that CheapSMC is used for. One input to our system is this protocol specification that
can be either implemented using our C++ library or via a possible custom program-
ming language, whose compiler turns the user input to an output compatible with our
programming API. Next, the user has to input the unit monetary cost of the operations
for the hardware specifications that secure executables will work on. We have imple-
mented a set of benchmark applications that can be easily executed by a user to find
the unit costs of each single operation. We would like to stress that this is a one-time
operation per the tested cloud environment.
Programming API. We implemented an extensible library in C++ programming
language that allows a user of our system to implement a secure protocol (e.g., set
intersection, biometric matching, etc.). We provided several operations in the API that
will cover a variety of applications. Currently, the set of operations O include addition
(Add), subtraction (Sub), multiplication (Mul), greater (Ge), equality (Eq), multiplexer
(Mux), binary xor (Xor), and binary and (And). There are also two additional operations
input (In) and output (Out) that allows the programmer to specify secret inputs to the
circuit, and to learn the outputs of the protocol execution.
As a proof of concept, we provided the interface as a C++ library that can be eas-
ily used to generate cost-optimal SMC executables. Additionally, this interface can be
bound with the compiler of a custom programming language. Using this custom pro-
gramming language, the user of our system can type the protocol specifications. Then
the compiler can simply generate the C++ program that in turn uses CheapSMC pro-
gramming interface. In any scenario, the programming interface morphs the protocol to
the circuit representation discussed in Section 3.
Optimizer. Given the circuit representation of the user protocol and the secret shar-
ing schemes that are provided by the SMC layer, the optimizer module applies one of
the heuristics (cf. Section 4.2) to assign secret sharing schemes to each node in the cir-
cuit. As we discussed previously, this module is responsible for finding the assignment
that minimizes the monetary cost of executing the protocol securely.
Due to the NP-Hard optimal partitioning problem, finding the optimal assignment
may be impractical even for a slightly large circuit. Hence, we proposed several heuris-
tics (cf. Section 4.2) that tries to find a reasonable solution. In the background, Cheap-
SMC applies each heuristic and chooses the one that gives the best result.
SMC Layer. Once the secret sharing schemes are assigned to each node in the cir-
cuit, CheapSMC gives the circuit to the SMC layer to generate the SMC executables.
There are several related works that provide mixed-protocol SMC tools, such as ABY
framework by Demmler et al [8], TASTY framework by Henecka et al. [13], Sharemind
framework by Bogdanov et al. [4], etc. We discuss all those tools in Section 7. The SMC
layer in our CheapSMC benefits from such existing tools, and is responsible for auto-
matically implementing the optimized circuit using the selected tool. We designed our
system to enable easy integration with any possible SMC tool. Note that since the se-
lected SMC tool provides the low-level implementation of the cryptographic primitives
(e.g., oblivious transfer [18, 20], multiplication triplets [2], sharing and reconstructing
secret inputs, etc.), we focus on optimizing user protocol using sharing assignments.
One clear connection between the SMC layer and the Optimizer module is the de-
pendency on the selected SMC tool. Since each SMC tool may provide a different set
of secret sharing mechanisms, the optimizer should perform the assignment such that
the optimal circuit can actually be realized and executed by the SMC layer. For instance
the ABY framework provides three different secret sharing schemes: arithmetic sharing,
boolean sharing, and garbled circuit sharing. On the other hand, the TASTY framework
allows additively homomorphic sharing and garbled circuit sharing. In any case, the
user is responsible for running our sample applications only once for the tested envi-
ronment and input the statistics data, while the SMC layer and the Optimizer exchanges
information about the available secret sharing schemes based on selected SMC tool.
4.2 Optimization Heuristics
In our work, we developed two new heuristics to solve the optimal partitioning problem
in addition to two existing heuristics. Below, we provide the details of these heuristics.
Bottom-up Heuristic. The key idea in this heuristic is to assign optimal secret
sharing scheme to the nodes in their topological order in the circuit. When a node ci ∈ C
is to be processed, the heuristic first assigns sharing schemes to the nodes that provide
input to ci. Based on the values assigned to the children, this heuristic selects the scheme
that minimizes the expected monetary cost for ci.
Top-Down Heuristic. In this technique, we process the nodes in the circuit in the
opposite manner compared to the previous heuristic, and assign secret sharing schemes
to the higher level nodes first and iterate down to the lower levels. The idea in this
heuristic is to assign the scheme that minimizes the cost of the current node given that
the schemes for the nodes that it is input to are already known. Assume that the secret
sharing scheme for the node ck is set to sk previously. Now when assigning the secret
sharing scheme for the node ci, this heuristic takes into account that the result of the
node ci should be converted to sk. The optimal decision is made with this consideration
in mind.
Fixed Secret Sharing. In this optimization heuristic, each node in the circuit is as-
signed the same secret sharing scheme. However, in some SMC tools, certain secret
sharing schemes may not necessarily support each single operation (e.g., Arithmetic
sharing in ABY framework does not support And, Xor, and Mux). In such a case, this
heuristic selects one scheme that supports each CheapSMC operation. One common
secret sharing scheme that is included in almost all SMC tools and supports each op-
eration is garbled circuit sharing that implements Yao’s garbled circuit protocol [27].
Using this heuristic, we can measure the monetary cost of executing the user protocol
by a single secret sharing scheme (e.g., pure SMC by garbled circuit sharing).
Hill-Climbing. This heuristic is based on the technique of Kerschbaum et al. [15].
The basic idea is to start by assigning a common secret sharing scheme (e.g., garbled
circuit sharing) to each node in the circuit. Next, we check if the total cost can be
reduced by changing the current secret sharing scheme of a node. This loop continues
till the total cost cannot be improved by any further assignment.
Algorithm 1 Hill-Climbing heuristic that assigns secret sharing schemes to the nodes
in the circuit
1: Known: O, S , C,
2: Known: P(o, s) and N(o, s) ∀o ∈ O,∀s ∈ δ(o),
3: Known: CP(si, sj) and CN(si, sj) ∀si, sj ∈ S ,
4: Known: α(ci) ∀ci ∈ C
5: function OPTIMIZECIRCUIT(C, sc ∈ S)
6: for all ci ∈ C do
7: γ(ci)← sc
8: end for
9: repeat
10: hasChanged← 0
11: for all ci ∈ C do
12: s← argmin
sj∈δ(α(ci))
cost(ci)
13: if s 6= γ(ci) then
14: γ(ci)← s
15: hasChanged← 1
16: end if
17: end for
18: until hasChanged = 1
19: end function
Algorithm 1 details the hill-climbing heuristic. It takes a circuit C and an initial
secret sharing scheme sc ∈ S that supports each operation in the circuit as inputs (step
5). First, this given scheme is assigned to each node in the circuit (steps 6-8). Then,
for each node in the circuit, it checks if the total cost of this node can be reduced by
changing its current secret sharing scheme to another one(step 12). If successful, the
change is processed and a flag is set to true to signal another round of loop iteration
(steps 13-16). This iteration continue until no improvement can be made (step 18).
4.3 Prototype Implementation
As a proof of concept, we implemented a prototype of CheapSMC using C++ program-
ming language. As discussed before, using the library of our programming interface,
a user can implement protocols that will be compiled into SMC executables. For the
SMC layer, we used the ABY framework by Demmler et al. [8]. The set of sharing
schemes that are provided by ABY are Arithmetic, Boolean, and garbled circuit sharing
(that we refer to as the Yao sharing). Only two operations (i.e., Add and Mul) are sup-
ported for the Arithmetic sharing, which are implemented using multiplications triplets
by Beaver et al. [2]. Boolean sharing support each CheapSMC operation, while the
low-level implementations by ABY are performed using Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson
(GMW) protocol [12]. Finally, Yao sharing support each operation in CheapSMC and
executes the operations using Yao’s garbled circuit protocol [27]. Further information
about the ABY framework can be found in [8].
5 Cost Profiling
5.1 Experiment Setup
Virtual Machines. We used four different virtual machine models in Amazon EC2
cloud service. Table 1 shows an overview of the VM specifications as of May 2015. We
focused on selecting two different VM types. The first two, m3.medium and m3.large,
are memory optimized models that provide better memory throughput. On the other
hand, the last two VM models are compute optimized that give faster processing through-
put. As can be seen from table 1, the number of virtual central processing units (vCPU)
and the memory sizes differ in the selected instances to test whether a faster (and more
expensive) VM model provides any monetary gains.
Model CPU Type (Intel Xeon) vCPU Memory (GB)
m3.medium E5-2670 v2 1 3.75
m3.large E5-2670 v2 2 7.5
c4.large E5-2666 v3 2 3.75
c4.xlarge E5-2666 v3 4 7.5
Table 1. The specifications of four different Amazon EC2 VM models as of May 2015.
Unit Costs. We selected two Amazon EC2 regions to initiate our VMs: North Vir-
ginia and Tokyo. As of May 2015, customers of Amazon EC2 service are charged
hourly, whereas the unit cost of running a VM varies with respect to its specifications.
Table 2 gives the unit costs of running a VM for an hour in North Virginia or Tokyo
Amazon EC2 regions. The network transfer cost also varies with respect to the Amazon
EC2 region. The unit network transfer cost in North Virginia for incoming and outgo-
ing network is $0.01/GB and $0.02/GB, respectively. For the Tokyo EC2 region, the
network costs are $0.01/GB for incoming and $0.09/GB for outgoing traffic.
Unit Cost (¢/hour)
N. Virginia Tokyo
m3.medium 7 10.1
m3.large 14 20.3
c4.large 11.6 14.7
c4.xlarge 23.2 29.4
Table 2. The average cost of running an Amazon EC2 VM model for an hour in two different
AWS EC2 regions.
Scenarios. We consider and perform cost measurements for two different scenarios.
In the first scenario that we refer to as the Intra-Region scenario, two parties in the
computation initiate their VMs in the same Amazon EC2 region, North Virginia. Since
Amazon does not charge network transfer between two VMs in the same region, the
network cost for each gate is simply zero. On the other hand, the computation cost is
simply running two VMs (one for the server, one for the client) for a given specification.
In the second scenario that we refer to as the Inter-Region scenario, one VM is
located in North Virginia, while the other is in Tokyo. The processing cost is the cost of
running two VMs in two different regions at the same time. We take the unit network
transmission cost of transferring as $0.065/GB. The reason is that there can be two
cases: the server is in Tokyo and the client is in North Virginia, or vice versa. Since the
server and the client roles can interchange, we take the unit cost of two cases.
Note that the server and the client uses the same Amazon EC2 VM model (i.e.,
m3.medium, etc.) in a given scenario for our experiments.
Secret Sharing Types. Since we used the ABY framework as our SMC layer, the
secret sharing types that are profiled in this section are the Arithmetic, Boolean, and
Yao secret sharing. We refer the reader to the original work for more details on the
secret sharing types [8].
Miscellaneous. In order to get the average cost of executing a single operation oi,
we generated circuits that have 1000 sequential oi operations on 32-bit inputs. We di-
vide the total time by 1000 to get the average execution time for oi. We repeat each
experiment 10 times and multiply the resulting number with the unit processing and
network transfer costs.
5.2 Results
Table 3 shows the average computational cost of executing an operation in Intra-Region
scenario. Note that the unit for each number in the table is ¢10−10. We calculated results
for four different Amazon EC2 models for each operation provided in CheapSMC,
along with the secret sharing conversion operations that are transparent to the user. For
each operation and model, the table shows the results of executing the operation with
Arithmetic, Boolean, or Yao sharing in top-down order. Since the arithmetic sharing
does not support operations other than Add and Mul, the results are simply null for
other operations. Moreover, the conversion costs are sharing independent and are the
same for each sharing type.
We see that executing Add and Mul using Arithmetic sharing is cheaper than the
other two in all VM models, while conversion from Yao and Boolean sharing to Arith-
metic sharing differs with the VM model. For instance, in m3.medium and m3.large, it
is cheaper to switch to Arithmetic sharing and execute an Add operation. On the other
hand in c4.large and c4.xlarge, the conversion cost makes it more expensive to switch
from Yao to Arithmetic and execute Add, compared to using Yao sharing. For the Mul
operation, Arithmetic sharing is favorable in all models. An interesting finding is the
disadvantage of Boolean sharing. Other than Add and Mul, in almost all cases, per-
forming an operation is cheaper using Yao sharing. Performing Xor and comparison
operations (i.e., Eq and Ge) in Yao sharing is much cheaper than Boolean sharing.
Table 4 shows the average computation cost of executing an operation in Inter-
Region scenario. Note that the unit for each result in the table is ¢10−6. One crucial
observation is that the costs are almost 4 fold higher in the Inter-Region scenario with
respect to the Intra-Region scenario due to the communication cost induced by the long
distance. It takes longer to exchange messages between two parties, thus resulting in
longer execution times and more costs. By looking at the table, it is fair to say that
Yao sharing outperform the other two sharing in many cases. Even performing a Mul
operation is cheaper with Yao sharings with respect to Arithmetic sharings. Add is still
the cheapest using Arithmetic sharing. However, the conversion cost from Boolean and
Yao to Arithmetic may make it a costly choice. Except few cases, executing operations
using Boolean sharing is too costly.
Add Sub Mul And Xor Mux Eq Ge A2B A2Y B2A B2Y Y2A Y2B
m3.medium
21.54 - 472.69 - - - - -
402.96 173.00 2791.63 412.06 13.22 414.20 28.01 399.73 156.99 143.41 38.77 51.64 73.32 35.93
82.11 162.79 3125.30 40.08 17.00 56.48 11.83 12.83
m3.large
50.30 - 781.58 - - - - -
466.67 202.35 3658.97 783.3 8.03 792.08 51.60 746.67 167.11 155.86 44.37 65.44 120.87 46.11
93.46 168.53 3240.53 44.13 19.60 62.62 9.22 12.49
c4.large
39.77 - 284.15 - - - - -
310.03 159.57 2397.78 293.64 23.27 302.41 53.83 272.40 144.04 144.33 22.91 60.36 95.31 43.94
72.08 115.56 2215.21 42.90 31.23 52.39 26.01 21.28
c4.xlarge
123.72 - 623.84 - - - - -
661.61 375.56 5534.74 649 62.25 664.42 145.65 602.45 321.06 295.51 144.09 180.99 205.20 135.17
188.53 272.43 4959 135.32 110.15 152.28 80.16 95.36
Table 3. The average computational cost of executing an operation in Intra-Region scenario for
four different Amazon EC2 VM models. The order of results from top to bottom in a given VM
model is Arithmetic, Boolean, and Yao sharing. The unit is ¢10−10.
Add Sub Mul And Xor Mux Eq Ge A2B A2Y B2A B2Y Y2A Y2B
m3.medium
2.90 - 2134.72 - - - - -
219.54 137.15 3350.81 2246.32 2.86 2122.63 11.55 2233.19 28.35 28.12 18.99 24.07 25.39 14.56
14.18 18.74 339.26 15.09 5.80 15.24 7.12 6.80
m3.large
5.57 - 4132.46 - - - - -
415.67 227.24 5754.01 4155.78 4.45 4273.34 21.08 3934.18 54.45 59.73 34.41 42.93 43.87 23.47
21.12 32.49 387.23 20.05 7.87 25.17 11.97 11.83
c4.large
3.66 - 2890.76 - - - - -
334.20 172.98 4123.40 2927.87 3.74 3182.07 16.36 2759.07 38.83 389.98 26.01 32.99 35.12 18.22
19.12 33.94 495.18 18.18 7.42 18.81 9.14 9.01
c4.xlarge
7.49 - 4954.67 - - - - -
691.22 349.52 7133.87 5546.53 7.48 5898.06 32.84 5440.71 77.32 77.39 53.01 67.84 73.17 37.06
37.78 60.53 868.64 36.77 14.16 36.81 18.51 18.15
Table 4. The average computational cost of executing an operation in Inter-Region scenario for
four different Amazon EC2 VM models. The order of results from top to bottom in a given VM
model is Arithmetic, Boolean, and Yao sharing. The unit is ¢10−6.
Table 5 shows the average network transfer cost of executing an operation in Inter-
Region scenario. Note that the unit for the numbers in the table is ¢10−6. The results
are applicable to each VM model, since the network transfer cost is calculated based
on the size of the transferred data. One major observation is the results for the Yao
sharing. If we had not included network transfer cost in our optimization formalization,
we would end up favoring Yao sharing for Add and Mul operations. However, we see
that network cost of executing Mul in Yao sharing introduces huge network cost, making
it less favorable compared to using Arithmetic sharing. The difference between the
network transfer and processing cost for executing Mul using Yao sharing is due to the
nature of the garbled circuit technique. The circuit (or the gate) should be garbled by the
server and sent to the client. The execution performed by the client may take less time
with respect to executing it with Boolean or Arithmetic sharing. However, the network
transfer introduces another dimension that should be considered.
Add Sub Mul And Xor Mux Eq Ge A2B A2Y B2A B2Y Y2A Y2B
all VMs
0 - 75.14 - - - - -
490.1 0 4258.8 67.6 0 2.6 65.52 188.045 199.94 199.94 37.57 66.82 137.41 99.84
99.84 0 6289.92 99.84 0 99.84 96.72 99.84
Table 5. The average network cost of executing an operation in Inter-Region scenario for all
Amazon EC2 VM models. The order of results from top to bottom is Arithmetic, Boolean, and
Yao sharing. The unit is ¢10−6.
6 Case Studies
6.1 Experiment Setup
The setup for the case studies is exactly the same as described in Section 5.1. We per-
form tests in two scenarios, Intra-Region and Inter-Region, for four different Amazon
EC2 VM models. We tested each scenario and VM model with four techniques: three
optimization heuristics (i.e., Top-down, Bottom-up, and Hill Climbing) and Pure-Yao,
which assigns Yao sharing (i.e., garbled circuit) to each node in the circuit.
In addition to the monetary cost of running CheapSMC, we also measure and show
the average running time of four techniques. Although our primary objective is to min-
imize the cost, we want to see if better performance is achieved by our heuristics. As
mentioned in Section 4.2., our optimization problem can be enhanced by introducing
performance constraints ( e.g., the expected running time should be less than some
threshold t). Given such a performance constraint, the heuristic solver may prune any
solution that does not satisfy the estimated performance constraint.
6.2 Biometric Matching
Biometric matching applications cover the two-party scenario, where (i) the server has
a set of private entries, and (ii) a client holding its private entry wants to learn the
closest entry in the server’s dataset based on some similarity measure. There are var-
ious problems related to this case study (e.g., biometric identification [10], fingercode
authentication [1], face recognition [9, 22], etc.). One of the commonly used distance
metric is squared Euclidean distance. In this protocol, the server and the client go over
the server’s dataset one by one, which results by the client learning the entry with the
minimal distance to its private input. We implemented this case study using our Pro-
gramming API for a dataset of 30 rows with 5 attributes of 32-bit numbers.
Table 6 shows the average running time for the Biometric Matching case study, two
different scenarios, four VM models, and four secret-sharing assignment heuristics. As
expected, the performance is much better in the Intra-Region scenario, where the par-
ties are in the same Amazon EC2 region. In all cases, applying any of the heuristics
gives lower running times compared to the Pure-GC assignment (i.e., each node is as-
signed the Yao sharing). Moreover, our heuristic of Top-Down assignment gives the
best running time for all VM models. It is 15% better than the Hill Climbing heuristic
of Kerschbaum et al [15] in terms performance. For the Inter-Region scenario, we see
that Pure-GC performs much better than the other techniques in terms of performance,
except the last model c4.xlarge. Since the physical distance between the two parties is
large (i.e., between Tokyo and North Virginia), network latency plays a vital role in the
overall performance. And it is shown many times that Yao sharing (i.e., garbled circuit)
is much better than any other solution in high-latency networks. Since our primary op-
timization objective is to minimize cost, not to minimize performance, the Inter-Region
results are not surprising.
Table 7 shows the monetary cost for the Biometric Matching case study with the
aforementioned setup. In the Intra-Region scenario, we see that our Top-Down heuristic
performs better than any other technique in all VM models. The reason is due to better
assignment of secret sharing schemes to the nodes in the circuit for this particular case
study compared to the other techniques. Note that the network communication cost
within the same region is 0 in Amazon EC2, which is why the network cost in Table 7
Execution time (ms)
Pure-GC Hill TD BU
IN
TR
A m3.med 1229.481 398.02 348.43 416.944
m3.large 715.5147 355.2913 321.388 372.529
c4.large 577.333 293.544 256.363 284.378
c4.xlarge 561.602 352.197 292.522 326.393
IN
TE
R m3.med 5518.04 6738.14 6237.37 6749.467
m3.large 4801.94 6096.73 6103.647 6083.193
c4.large 8731.577 35580.13 33267.77 35569.97
c4.xlarge 9118.693 6916.357 6381.093 6826.727
Table 6. The average execution time for the Biometric Matching case study in Amazon EC2
Cloud. The results are for two different scenarios, four different VM models, and four different
techniques.
Computation Cost (¢10−3) Network Cost (¢10−3) Total Cost (¢10−3)
Pure-GC Hill TD BU Pure-GC Hill TD BU Pure-GC Hill TD BU
IN
TR
A m3.med 4.78 1.55 1.36 1.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.78 1.55 1.36 1.62
m3.large 5.57 2.76 2.50 2.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.57 2.76 2.50 2.90
c4.large 3.72 1.89 1.65 1.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.72 1.89 1.65 1.83
c4.xlarge 7.24 4.54 3.77 4.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.24 4.54 3.77 4.21
IN
TE
R m3.med 27.74 33.88 31.36 33.93 990.71 189.71 129.71 189.71 1018.46 223.58 161.07 223.64
m3.large 45.75 58.09 58.15 57.96 990.71 189.71 129.71 189.71 1036.46 247.80 187.86 247.67
c4.large 63.79 259.93 243.04 259.86 990.71 218.29 173.27 218.29 1054.50 478.23 416.31 478.15
c4.xlarge 133.23 101.06 93.23 99.75 990.71 189.71 129.71 189.71 1123.95 290.76 222.94 289.45
Table 7. The average computational, network, and total cost of running the Biometric Matching
case study in Amazon EC2 Cloud. The results are for two different scenarios, four different VM
models, and four different techniques.
is simply 0. In the Inter-Region scenario, Top-Down heuristic once again gives the
cheapest assignments for all VM models. It performs 30% better than the Hill Climbing
heuristic. In terms of computation cost, we see that Pure-GC performs better due to the
reasons discussed before (i.e., high network latency). However, in terms of total cost,
Top-Down heuristic introduces up to 80% reduction.
6.3 Matrix Multiplication
Matrix Multiplication is a common building block of various applications (e.g., linear
transformations, group theory, etc.). Given two matrices A and B of size n by n, a
common algorithm is the O(n3) algorithm that multiplies each row of A with each
column of B. We implemented this algorithm using our Programming API for two
matrices of sizes 5x5.
Execution time (ms)
Pure-GC Hill TD BU
IN
TR
A m3.med 939.70 104.54 132.94 55.61
m3.large 504.76 18.00 16.64 16.30
c4.large 385.30 84.88 85.85 84.88
c4.xlarge 388.16 82.14 80.09 84.52
IN
TE
R m3.med 5932.34 2258.09 2237.64 2211.83
m3.large 4175.28 2243.93 2234.97 2240.41
c4.large 8777.51 2247.47 2248.17 2253.02
c4.xlarge 7079.163 2273.117 2246.723 2257.253
Table 8. The average execution time for the Matrix Multiplication case study in Amazon EC2
Cloud. The results are for two different scenarios, four different VM models, and four different
techniques.
Table 8 shows the average running time for the Matrix Multiplication case study for
two different scenarios, four VM models, and four secret-sharing assignment heuristics.
In the Intra-Region scenario, our heuristic of Bottom-Up gives better performance for
the first 3 VM models, while the Hill Climbing technique is the fastest for the c4.xlarge
model. Once again, we focus on minimizing the monetary cost, not the running time.
Still, our techniques are better than the existing technique of Kerschbaum et al. in all
but one case. A similar statement is also true for the Inter-Region scenario: Our tech-
niques perform better in 3 different VM models, while Hill Climbing is better in c4.large
model. Compared to the Pure-GC technique, all heuristics perform much better in terms
of performance, reducing the running time up to 60% in most cases.
Computation Cost (¢10−3) Network Cost (¢10−3) Total Cost (¢10−3)
Pure-GC Hill TD BU Pure-GC Hill TD BU Pure-GC Hill TD BU
IN
TR
A m3.med 3.65 0.41 0.52 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.65 0.41 0.52 0.22
m3.large 3.93 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.93 0.14 0.13 0.13
c4.large 2.48 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.48 0.55 0.55 0.55
c4.xlarge 5.00 1.06 1.03 1.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 1.06 1.03 1.09
IN
TE
R m3.med 29.83 11.35 11.25 11.12 796.22 9.39 9.39 9.39 826.05 20.75 20.64 20.51
m3.large 39.78 21.38 21.29 21.35 796.22 9.39 9.39 9.39 836.01 30.77 30.69 30.74
c4.large 64.12 16.42 16.42 16.46 796.22 9.39 9.39 9.39 860.35 25.81 25.82 25.85
c4.xlarge 103.43 33.21 32.83 32.98 796.22 9.39 9.39 9.39 899.66 42.61 42.22 42.37
Table 9. The average computational, network, and total cost of running the Matrix Multiplication
case study in Amazon EC2 Cloud. The results are for two different scenarios, four different VM
models, and four different techniques.
Table 9 shows the monetary cost for the Matrix Multiplication case study with the
aforementioned setup. For the Intra-Region scenario, our techniques both perform better
than or equal to the Hill Climbing technique in all VM models. Excluding the c4.xlarge
model, our Bottom-Up technique wins the head to head comparison with other tech-
niques. For the Inter-Region scenario, we see that except the c4.large VM model, our
techniques give less total monetary cost than the other ones. In terms of the network
cost, all three heuristics perform the same. However, the difference in the computa-
tion cost decides the leading technique in terms of total cost. Note that the differences
between the heuristics is extremely small.
One final generic observation for both case studies is the importance of VM model
selection. Based on our case study results, it is shown that choosing faster and more
expensive VM model does not necessarily produce cheaper SMC executions. We see
that for both case studies, in most cases, memory optimized VM types (i.e., m3.medium
and m3.large) result in cheaper SMC executions, while executing the same user protocol
in compute optimized VM types (i.e., c4.large and c4.xlarge) is a lot more expensive.
7 Related Work
There are many different works that abstract SMC implementation and provide users a
user-friendly way to generate SMC executables. Holzer et al [14] proposed a compiler
that translates programs written in ANSI-C to their optimal garbled circuit executables.
The authors modify the existing compiler tools, which already optimize the program in
the background. The VIFF framework provides a tradeoff between execution termina-
tion and efficiency, and approaches the SMC execution in an asynchronous manner [7].
Multiple operations can be executed in parallel, further reducing the performance over-
head, provided that the protocol is not guaranteed to terminate.
Fairplay and later extended to FairplanMP were among the first efforts to intro-
duce SMC executable generations in the background [3, 16]. Fairplay allows a user to
implement its protocol in SFDL, a custom intermediate language. Then, the compiler
transforms the user protocol into garbled circuit executables, which can be executed
by two parties in Fairplay, and by multiple parties in FairplayMP. GraphSC by Nayak
et al. provide a similar intermediate language that is specifically designed for graph-
based algorithms [19]. It aims to minimize the performance overhead by greatly paral-
leling the computations that are represented as garbled circuits. The work of Mood et
al. provide a library to generate garbled circuit executables for mobile applications [17].
ObliVM similarly translates programs written in custom language to their garbled cir-
cuit representations [26]. TinyGarble performs further optimizations on the garbled cir-
cuit generation [25]. Finally, Wysteria is a strongly typed intermediate language that
once again generate garbled circuit executables [21]. None of the mentioned works can
be used in our framework, since they provide only a single secret sharing scheme. Fur-
ther improvements on the performance, and thus monetary cost, can not be achieved by
switching between multiple schemes.
One SMC tool that is suitable to (and also used in) our framework in SMC layer
is the ABY framework [8]. It makes use of state-of-the-art optimization for each single
operation, and provides a C++ library to implement user protocols. The secret sharing
schemes that are supported in ABY are Arithmetic, Boolean, and Yao’s garbled circuit.
The L1 framework is another SMC framework, written in Java, and supports the same
set of secret sharing schemes [23]. Sharemind provides additive secret sharing and Yao’s
garbled circuit as the available secret sharing schemes, and allows a user to generate
SMC executables of its protocol [4]. The work of Choudhury et al. provide a frame-
work that uses garbled circuit and fully homomorphic encryption as the secret sharing
schemes [5]. Tasty allows additively homomorphic encryption and garbled circuits as
the secret sharing schemes [13]. None of the mentioned works consider optimizing the
performance (or monetary cost) by selecting different secret sharing schemes for differ-
ent statements (or nodes in the circuit).
One work that is closely related to ours is the work of Kerschbaum et al. [15]. How-
ever, their work differs from ours in terms of the focus of optimization: We aim to
minimize the monetary cost of executing the user protocol in SMC, while they solely
focus on the performance. As discussed in Section 5.2, introducing additional dimen-
sions such as network transmission cost may vary the secret sharing selection for a node
during the optimization process.
8 Conclusion
In this work, we propose CheapSMC, an SMC framework that aims to minimize the
monetary cost of executing SMC protocols in the cloud. We performed extensive cost
profiling for the Amazon EC2 cloud service. We tested four different VM models and
two scenarios (i.e., Inter-Region and Intra-Region). Moreover, we leveraged the gath-
ered statistics and applied our system two case studies: Biometric matching and matrix
multiplication. We showed that the cost of executing SMC using our heuristics is up
to 96% and 30% less than using pure garbled circuit and Hill-Climbing, respectively.
Moreover, we conclude that purchasing faster and more expensive VM model from
Amazon EC2 does not necessarily reduce the total monetary cost of executing SMC
protocols. In general, compute optimized VMs result in more expenses, while memory
optimized ones produce cheaper SMC executions.
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